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The first several years of the New Order witnessed the ascendance and subsequent 
decline of the so-called "financial generals," among whom the most prominent were 
Alamsjah Prawiranegara and Soedjono Hoemardani. Both men were members of Presi­
dent Suharto's staff of personal assistants, and both had ties to him which stretched back 
many years. Soedjono had been Suharto's chief finance officer during the late 1950s 
when he commanded the Diponegoro Division, and during the early 1960s Alamsjah 
had served with Suharto in the Army's headquarters in Jakarta. At that time, Alamsjah 
had been Assistant 7/Finance and Soedjono had been a member of his staff. The special 
relationship which existed between Suharto and the two men was evident in the com­
position of the group of people with whom Suharto surrounded himself. Colonel 
Soedjono Hoemardani was just as frequently at Suharto's side as General Alamsjah and 
various other generals, such as Kartakusuma and Daryatmo, who accompanied the 
president to important meetings.2 In July or August 1966, about five months after he was 
named acting president, but still several months before Sukarno would vacate the 
position of president, Suharto formed a "personal staff" (Staf Pribadi, Spri) of some 
eighteen advisers, consisting of six army officers and two teams of civilians. Soedjono 
was one of three junior officers who served as a member of the Spri under the direction 
of General Alamsjah who, significantly, has been described as the "epitome of the 
military entrepreneur."3
H he writer would like to acknowledge the assistance which he has received in the preparation of this paper 
and in the conduct of related, ongoing research. In particular, Benedict Anderson and Donald Emmerson 
have offered comments on Soedjono's life and military career, Takashi Shiraishi has located and translated 
articles from Japanese newspapers, as well as commenting on Japan's relations with Indonesia, Franklin 
Weinstein and Ann Gregory have kindly provided notes from interviews they conducted with Soedjono, and 
Francisia Seda has offered her assistance in unraveling the complexity of the Asahan project negotiations. Of 
course, all errors in the article remain the author's.
^See for example, Angkatan Bersendjata, July 11-13, 1966 and Kompas, July 11-13, 1966.
^Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 243.
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Despite the fact that he began his career in the New Order as Alamsjah's subordinate, 
Soedjono not only outlasted him as a close presidential adviser, but also usurped his role 
as Suharto's principal contact with Japan. For Soedjono, this was a coup, for it came at 
the point when Indonesia's relations with Japan were being rebuilt and were on the 
verge of a tremendous expansion. Moreover, because of the turbulence affecting the 
Indonesian government during the late 1960s and early 1970s as the New Order was 
established and Suharto attempted to assert his own authority, many aspects of govern­
ment tended to be dealt with on an ad hoc basis, outside formal channels of government 
but with presidential authorization. Consequently, Soedjono's position as a presidential 
adviser, yvithout a formal ministerial role, placed him in an advantageous location from 
which to become involved not only in domestic affairs, but in international ones as well. 
His background in military finance, and his success in assisting Suharto financially in 
the 1950s, promised him the trust and support of his commander-turned-president for 
further financial initiatives under the New Order.
From the very beginning of the New Order, Soedjono traveled to those countries 
which were most important to Indonesia in achieving its goals of economic stabilization 
and development. In September 1966, he undertook his first foreign trip since returning 
in 1964 from a ten month course at the US Army's Finance School at Fort Benjamin 
Harrison, Indianapolis. This time, he traveled to the Netherlands, the United States, and 
Japan with Foreign Minister Adam Malik's delegation which in New York announced 
Indonesia's decision to return to the United Nations. Shortly before departing for the 
Netherlands to join Malik, according to Soedjono, he queried President Suharto regard­
ing what the delegation should do when it appeared at the United Nations; Suharto's 
answer, he claimed, was only one word: “Masuk" ("Enter").4 Soedjono thus rejected the 
notion that Suharto's concern not to offend Sukarno made him more reluctant than 
Malik to rejoin the international body. By adding that "I am the one who knows about 
this, only me, no one else,"5 Soedjono also emphasized, albeit indirectly, his closeness to 
the president in matters of the greatest political significance.
While in the United States, Soedjono accompanied Malik and Anwar Sani, the 
director general of the Indonesian Foreign Office, to a meeting at the White House with 
President Lyndon B. Johnson and two of his advisers, Walt Rostow and William Jorden, 
as well as the US ambassador to Indonesia, Marshall Green.6 Although large portions of 
the record of their discussion remain classified, it appears that President Johnson was 
most interested in the issue of communism in Southeast Asia. In particular, he asked 
about Indonesia's view of the Vietnam conflict, what Indonesia thought the United 
States might do to resolve it, and "whether, in the Foreign Minister's opinion, the 
Communists had been decisively beaten in Indonesia." Unfortunately, the Indonesian 
responses have been excised and, from the available material, it does not appear that 
Soedjono played an active role in the meeting.7
4Franklin Weinstein, "Notes of interviews with Soedjono," December 10,1969, p. 15.
5Ibid.
6US Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, 27 September 1966; in Declassified Documents 
Quarterly Catalog: 1982 8, 4 (October-December 1982), microfiche no. 002522.
7Soedjono claimed to have visited the United States again in 1967 at the invitation of the State Department; 
but no corroborative evidence is available on this point. A declassified, but heavily sanitized, White House 
memorandum, indicates that an Indonesian delegation called on Walt Rostow on July 18, 1967 to request, on 
behalf of Suharto, "White House assistance in connection with Indonesian aid needs." It is entirely possible 
that Soedjono was among that delegation and that it was the visit to which he referred. White House
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After leaving the United States, the delegation flew to Tokyo, where Soedjono was 
introduced for the first time to members of the influential "Indonesia lobby" in Japan, 
among them Nakajima Shinzaburo, a businessman with close ties to Indonesia, Kimura 
Takeo, a conservative politician and head of the Cabinet Secretariat, and Fukuda Takeo, 
the minister of finance. Probably because of Nakajima's former role as a supporter of the 
PRRI-Permesta rebels,8 Soedjono became distinctly "nervous" when questioned about 
who had introduced him to Nakajima. However, he was at pains to differentiate the 
nature of Indonesia's ties to Japan under the New Order from the "mutual suspicion," 
caused by "dirty practices," which he said had characterized the two countries' relations 
during the Sukarno years. As a consequence of the Sukarno period's legacy, Soedjono 
claimed, it was not until 1969 that Indonesia "achieved smooth relations with Japan."9
While Indonesia's relations with Japan may have improved only slowly, Soedjono 
seems to have moved very quickly to establish himself as an important intermediary 
between the New Order government and Japan's Indonesia lobby. At some point in 1967, 
he received a visit from Kubota Yutaka regarding the possibility of resuming the con­
struction of the Asahan hydro-electric generating-cum-aluminum smelting project in 
Sumatra which had been discontinued in 1963 following the departure of a Russian 
team. Kubota had been interested in the development of the Asahan river's hydro-elec­
tric potential since the late 1930s, and during World War II had headed the Japanese 
occupation's Sumatran Water Resources Development Survey Mission. Immediately 
following the war he had established the engineering consulting firm Nippon Koei and, 
during the 1950s, had lobbied, albeit unsuccessfully, for an Asahan river development 
project to be included in Japan's reparations payments to Indonesia. However, his firm 
had "gained nearly an exclusive hold over Indonesia's infrastructure projects under the 
reparations fund."10 According to A. R. Soehoed, later chairman of the Asahan project, 
in 1967 Kubota visited Soedjono in Jakarta to propose that he begin again to research the 
Asahan project, this time with financing provided by Nippon Koei. Soedjono apparently 
agreed and, "with the blessing of Acting President Suharto," Kubota received permission 
to resume his research into the project.11
Why Kubota approached Soedjono in this matter is open to speculation. However, it 
would appear that Soedjono's meeting with members of the Indonesia lobby during his 
visit to Japan in 1966 had produced useful contacts. One possibility is that Kimura, later 
known as a strong supporter of the Asahan project,12 *had recommended to Kubota that 
Soedjono would be receptive to approaches by interested Japanese investors. However,
Memorandum for the Record, 19 July 1967; in Declassified Documents Quarterly Cataloq: 1985, no. 11, Vol.l 
(January-March 1985), microfiche no. 000611.
^PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia—Revolutionary Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia) was the Sumatra-based branch of the 1958 regional rebellion against the Sukarno government. 
Permesta (Perjuangan Semesta Alam—Inclusive Struggle) was the name used by the rebels based in 
Sulawesi.
9 Weinstein, "Notes of interviews," February 26, 1973, p. 1.
^M asashi Nishihara, The Japanese and Sukarno's Indonesia: Tokyo-Jakarta Relations, 1951-1966 (Kyoto:
Kyoto University Press, 1976; and Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1976), pp. 66-67,103.
^A .R . Soehoed, Asahan: Impian yang menjadi kenyataan (Jakarta: privately published, 1983), p. 31.
^Kim ura is best known for his statement during a visit to the project some time in the early 1970s that he
would commit hara kiri if the project were not completed successfully as a cooperative Japanese-Indonesian 
venture. Bisuk Siahaan, Sejarah pembangunan proyek Asahan: Membangunkan raksasa sedang tidur 
(Jakarta: privately published, 1984), p. 217.
50 Michael Malley
other information points to his reliance on former PRRI/Permesta rebel officers who 
had sought support from right-wing Japanese in their opposition to Sukarno during the 
late 1950s. According to a brief paper written by three conservative Japanese business­
men, including Nakajima, whom Soedjono acknowledged having met in 1966, Jan 
Walandouw was the one who introduced Kubota to Soedjono.15
In response to criticism of the business activities in which some of his close assistants 
were alleged to be engaged, President Suharto "disbanded" his personal staff in mid-June 
1968; however, three members of that staff—all army officers—were reappointed imme­
diately as personal assistants (Asisten Pribadi, Aspri),14 and the institution remained 
essentially unchanged. What did begin to change, however, was the power balance 
among the Aspri. Notably, Alamsjah had not been reappointed as an Aspri, as had 
Soedjono and Ali, although he did retain the position of state secretary to which he had 
been appointed at the end of January.15 That Alamsjah's position in the inner circle of 
presidential advisers began to decline in early to mid-1968 is well known.16 In addition to 
the fact that this occurred, the reasons why it happened are of special importance for 
understanding how and into what areas the influence of Soedjono expanded in the next 
few years.
In the months preceding the dissolution of the Spri, Soedjono's influence had 
received a boost as a result of a serious miscalculation by Alamsjah which not only led, 
ultimately, to Alamsjah's downfall, but also limited his influence in a rapidly expanding 
area of Indonesian foreign relations—economic diplomacy vis-^-vis Japan. By late 
January 1968, it had become public knowledge that Acting President Suharto was plan­
ning a trip to Tokyo to seek economic aid. It also became known that such a visit had 
been arranged to start on March 28 and that Alamsjah, as Suharto's personal representa­
tive, had already met several times with Japanese Prime Minister Sato Eisaku to discuss 
the aid problem and Suharto's visit.17 As part of Alamsjah's "advance group," Soedjono 
was also involved in arranging Suharto's trip. In addition, however, this series of visits 
in early 1968 provided him with the opportunity to meet Japanese officials, to introduce 
to them the new face of government in Indonesia now that Sukarno had passed from 
the scene, and to impress upon them the New Order's interest in improving relations 
with Japan.18
The main problems confronting Indonesia in its quest for Japanese aid were apparent 
in press reports during the early months of 1968.19 First, the Japanese government was
15Inamine Ichiro, Tamai Kenji, and Nakajima Shinzaburo, "Asahan Dam Project no Haikei [Background to 
the Asahan Dam project]" Indonesia Center, Tokyo, August 8, 1973, mimeo. Walandouw acknowledges 
having been deeply involved in seeking foreign support for the anti-Sukarno forces during the late 1950s, and 
has said that he knew Inamine at that time. (Confidential source.)
14 “SPRI dibubarkan, Asisten Pribadi dibentuk," Kompas, June 13, 1968. The other two Aspri named at that 
time were Major General Suryo Wiryohadiputro and Colonel Ali Murtopo.
15Kompas, February 3, 1968.
16Crouch, Army and Politics, p. 308; David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals, Indonesian Military Politics 
1975-1983 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984), p. 23.
17"Djepang berusaha keras memenuhi permintaan Indonesia," Kompas, January 24, 1968; and "Sato: 
Djepang akan selesaikan soal kredit kepada Indonesia," ibid., January 26,1968.
18Sofyan Wanandi and J. Soedjati Djiwandono, "Soedjono Hoemardani dan Jepang," in Soedjono 
Hoemardani: Pendiri CSIS 1918-1986 (Jakarta: CSIS, 1987), p. 82.
19See also Franklin B. Weinstein, 'The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell 
University, 1972), pp. 634-39.
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already being pressured by the United States to contribute one third of the $325 million 
aid package, or about $110 million, approved earlier that year by the Inter-Governmental 
Group on Indonesia (IGGI), a group of Western creditor nations. Second, the Japanese 
government, though willing to grant low interest credits to Indonesia, was constrained 
by legal restrictions on the amount and form in which such aid could be given. More­
over, the Japanese-government—during the course of debate on the government budget 
for the coming fiscal year—was at that time attempting to respond to opposition party 
complaints regarding Indonesia's alleged misuse of previous foreign aid while also 
attempting to pass new regulations to permit loans to be extended at lower interest and 
in larger amounts. As a result, the Japanese government was unable either to make a 
formal decision on aid, or to give a strong public commitment on the issue.
Alamsjah was aware of these problems, but "chose to give more weight to the opti­
mistic words of his Indonesia lobby friends."20 He was not alone; in fact, Adam Malik 
appears to have been one of only a few individuals who advised Suharto that the 
Japanese were not likely to make an aid commitment even if he (Suharto) personally 
went to Tokyo. Most advisers, including Soedjono, apparently felt that Japan could not 
and would not refuse aid if Suharto, who was elevated to full president only days before 
leaving for Tokyo, himself requested it. Thus, the president departed from Jakarta for a 
trip to Japan (and Cambodia) on March 28, with the expectation that his Japanese hosts 
would give him, at the very least, a firm commitment of approximately $100 million.
For a president who placed such reliance on the advice of trusted personal advisers, 
the Japanese reception must have come as a rude shock. Rather than fulfilling Alam- 
sjah's sunny predictions of forthcoming aid, official Japanese representatives met the 
Indonesian delegation at the airport with warnings not to expect too much during their 
visit. Upon his arrival, Foreign Minister Adam Malik was met by the Japanese foreign 
and agriculture ministers, Miki and Nishimura, and told that the decision on aid was up 
to Suharto and Sato alone. At the same time, Indonesian Finance Minister Frans Seda 
was met by his Japanese opposite number, Mizuta, who informed him that aid was 
stalled for the moment for two reasons: first, a change in the OECF's (Overseas Economic 
Cooperation Fund's) statutory law was pending in the Diet and, second, the Japanese 
"national account was in trouble."21 In essence, both Indonesian officials were being told 
that Indonesia had chosen an inopportune occasion to come to Japan and that circum­
stances would not permit any formal aid commitment. Although President Suharto 
remained in Tokyo for three full days longer, attempting to pressure the Japanese gov­
ernment to give aid equal to one third of the total IGGI-approved assistance, the Sato 
government was unable to respond positively.
Events attending the conclusion of this mistaken journey reflected the high hopes of 
the Indonesians and their intense frustration at having failed; most of all, it reflected 
their concern that Suharto had suffered an affront to the dignity of his position. By the 
end of their fourth day in Tokyo, the Indonesian delegation had decided to express their 
dissatisfaction with their reception in Tokyo by refusing to issue a joint communique 
before their departure the next day for Phnom Penh. Later that night, for reasons which 
remain unknown, Soedjono attempted—on his own "initiative," he later claimed22—to 
salvage the mission by bringing his recent acquaintance, Kimura Takeo, a member of the
20Ibid., p. 635, n. 115.
21Asahi Shimbun, March 29, 1968 (a.m. ed.).
22Weinstein, "Notes of interviews," February 26,1973, p. 7.
52 Michael Malley
Indonesia lobby and head of the Cabinet Secretariat, to see Suharto. Franklin Weinstein 
has described the confused situation which followed:
Kimura claimed that Sato had authorized him to say that the Japanese government 
was now prepared to accept the 1/3 formula. The next morning Malik told Japanese 
Foreign Minister Miki that if he could confirm the statement of Kimura, Indonesia 
would sign' the communique. But Miki said he had no information corroborating 
Kimura's statement, and later, as Soeharto was preparing to leave for the airport, 
Miki told Malik that Kimura had not been sent by Sato.23
Two things suggest that this episode represents a premature attempt by Soedjono to 
exercise fhe influence which he would possess only later. First, it seems most unlikely 
that, after four days of declining to give the aid commitment sought by Indonesia, Sato 
would suddenly have changed his mind that night and authorized someone else to give 
such a commitment—and the next morning deny having done so. Second, if Soedjono 
did indeed act alone, i.e., if Kimura was not sent but brought, then Soedjono was trading 
not only on Kimura's stature, but his own, though it is unclear what could have been 
accomplished without Sato's explicit approval; after all, Indonesia had been demanding, 
at a minimum, precisely what Japan could not give—an explicit, public undertaking that 
approximately $100 million in aid would be forthcoming that year.
A year and a half later, Soedjono denied that the trip had been a disaster, or even that 
it had been primarily an attempt to obtain aid. He described its purpose as "merely to 
repay the official visit of Sato previously" (in late 1967).24 Despite the disingenuous 
nature of these remarks, his additional comments suggest that he did in fact understand 
the crux of the situation: "The real problem in the aid negotiations was not at all 
between Indonesia] and Japan, but between the Japanese government and the [Japanese] 
parliament."25 The "real problem," however, may have been that Alamsjah, Soedjono, 
and Suharto's other close advisers did not achieve this level of understanding of 
Japanese domestic politics until after they had undertaken the journey. The incapacita­
tion of the Japanese government in late March, caused by domestic political struggles 
during the annual budget talks, was wholly predictable and could easily have been fore­
seen by more experienced officials.
In the incident, the Tokyo government suffered equally from a lack of understanding 
of the Jakarta government's mode of operation. Sato, as well as Suharto, was embar­
rassed by the failure of the trip, since he had promised Suharto several months earlier 
that Japan would give the aid requested at that time by the Indonesian president. He had 
tried to forestall the trip, but had relied on formal channels of government-to-govern- 
ment communication. As a result, Sato's message was not passed on to Suharto by his 
most trusted advisers—Generals Alamsjah and Soedjono—but by Malik and Seda, 
political party figures whose advice he was apparently less inclined to accept.
Despite the fact that Soedjono had concurred in Alamsjah's optimistic pre-visit 
assessment of the likelihood of obtaining aid, the trip was later characterized by an Opsus
23Weinstein, "Uses of Foreign Policy/' p. 637, n. 119.
24Weinstein, "Notes of interviews," December 10, 1969, p. 11; Soedjono maintained exactly the same position 
four years later, saying that "It was just a trip to reciprocate [the] earlier Sato visit. Aid was discussed, but that 
was not the purpose of the trip." Weinstein, "Notes of interviews," February 26,1973, p. 7.
25lbid., December 10,1969, p. 11.
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source as "the worst of Alamsjah's many blunders/'26 and Soedjono, as the junior assis­
tant, escaped blame. In the course of the next year, the two men became increasingly dis­
tant as Alamsjah apparently considered it unfair that Soedjono was gaining influence at 
his expense. Alamsjah admitted as much the following year when asked about the 
already evident split between him and his former junior colleague. He became very 
"agitated" by mention of this issue, and, directing his criticism at Soedjono's spiritual 
reputation, complained "that Sudjono is crazy, that he is not intelligent, that he is just a 
dukun."27
*  * *
The year following Soedjono's appointment to the president's redesigned personal 
staff was a busy and controversial one. In July 1969, Kubota Yutaka presented him with 
the results of Nippon Koei's preliminary investigation into the status of the Asahan 
project. Soedjono, in turn, presented the findings to Suharto, who is reported to have 
ordered that the project be carried out, as long as its development did not harm the 
national budget or disrupt the flow of foreign aid into Indonesia, i.e., as long as its devel­
opment was funded by private foreign capital. Despite Suharto's support, however, 
Kubota was unable to obtain contracts for "more specified studies" until May of the fol­
lowing year.28 According to interested Japanese sources, Soedjono and Jan Walandouw 
assisted Kubota and Nippon Koei in obtaining this contract.29 In July 1970, Nippon Koei 
was awarded a contract by the Indonesian government, to be funded with $800,000 from 
the OECF, to carry out a study of the suitability and proposed design of hydro-electric 
generating plants at two locations on the Asahan river.30 Although there does not seem 
to have been a great deal of progress over the course of the next two years, the require­
ment that the project's financing not be drawn from Indonesia's national budget or from 
scheduled foreign aid, and the obvious impossibility of private Indonesian investors 
supplying the funds, cleared the way for Soedjono to become more actively involved.
One of his first public activities as an Aspri was to negotiate the release from jail in 
Tokyo of two businessmen accused of breaking Japanese law. The two men had been 
working for the Mexim Company, a subsidiary of PT Mantrust, which had been estab­
lished in May 1967 in order to facilitate Japanese aid-assisted exports to Indonesia; most 
of its share capital was held by an Indonesian-born Japanese businessman Kida Namio. 
Kida and Santoso Sutantyo, an Indonesian working for Mexim, had arranged, in 1967, to 
export two machines for making artificial rice, officially valued at 640 million yen, from 
Japan to PT Djaya, another Mantrust subsidiary, in Jakarta. By declaring the price of the 
machinery to be an inflated 900 million yen, they were able to obtain a clear profit of 260 
million yen which they then converted to US dollars on the Hong Kong foreign 
exchange market.31 On August 11, 1969, Japanese police arrested the two businessmen on 
charges of violating Japanese trade and foreign exchange laws, since they had manipu­
26Weinstein, "Uses of Foreign Policy," p. 635, n. 115.
27Ann Gregory, "Notes of interview with Alamsjah," June 12,1969.
28Nishihara, Japanese and Sukarno's Indonesia, p. 122, n. 9; "Projek Asahan pasti dimulai tahun 1973," 
Kompas, April 10,1972; "Matinya air terdjun sigura-gura," ibid., April 14, 1972.
29Inamine, Tamai, and Nakajima, "Background to Asahan."
30Siahaan, Sejarah pembangunan proyek Asahan, p.242.
31"Pengusaha Indonesia ditahan polisi Djepang karena manipulasi 260 djuta yen," Kompas, August 13, 1969. 
The source of this article was acknowledged as Kyodo news service.
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lated the export price of goods in order to claim an amount of yen-denominated aid in 
excess of that to which they were entitled.
Over the course of the next two months, Soedjono visited Japan several times, ini­
tially to seek the release of the two businessmen, and later to attempt to minimize any 
resulting damage to Indonesian-Japanese relations.32 Reportedly, as a result of Soe- 
djono's intervention with the Japanese minister of finance, Fukuda Takeo, and the 
prime minister, Sato Eisaku, the businessmen were released about one month following 
their incarceration. Furthermore, as a result of Soedjono's patronage—and that of fellow 
Aspri Suryo and State Logistics Board (Badan Urusan Logistik, Bulog) chief Achmed 
Tirtosudiro—PT Mantrust continued to prosper.33
The following year, Suharto reacted to the continuing charges of corruption in his 
government by appointing a Commission of Four (Komisi IV) to investigate the matter. 
Its report was never published officially, but its contents did appear over the course of 
several days in a Jakarta newspaper. The first of those reports singled out PT Mantrust as 
one of a handful of companies requiring special attention because of its questionable 
practices.34 Approximately two weeks after the publication of the commission's findings, 
Suharto issued a presidential decision in which he declared explicitly that the Aspri did 
not have "executive power,"35 possibly hoping thereby to reduce the public attention to 
and concern with the many roles of the Aspri.
*  *  *
Less than two years later, in 1972, students and newspapers again began making 
accusations of corruption within the regime, this time with increasing vehemence and 
with the support of certain powerful military figures. Soedjono Hoemardani was once 
more among their most prominent targets. His principal offense in the eyes of his critics, 
this time, was not so much alleged impropriety in domestic financial affairs as his 
admittedly large role in facilitating—and exploiting—the inflow of Japanese investment, 
which grew rapidly in the early 1970s.
The early 1970s were an especially active time for him in the area of Japanese 
investment, not only in facilitating the efforts of eager investors, but in encouraging 
them to invest in a way which suited the Indonesian government's objectives. Among 
the largest and most significant investments in which he was involved were the Asahan 
project and the establishment of a new oil export company to serve the Japanese market, 
the Japan Indonesia Oil Company (JIO).
As noted above, Suharto had approved the continued development of the Asahan 
project in 1969, after Soedjono presented him with the results of a Japanese study. In 
1971, probably early in the year, Nippon Koei completed the second stage of the research
32"Sudjono Humardani minta kepada Menteri Keuangan Djepang," Indonesia Raya, September 10, 1969; 
"Sudjono Humardani di Djepang," ibid., September 17, 1969; and "Sudjono Humardani akan menemui Sato 
& Fukuda," ibid., September 22, 1969. Soedjono later claimed that his only reason for going to Japan was to 
discuss problems relating to Indonesia's foreign debt. He claimed that the only action he took with regard to 
the Mexim/Mantrust case was to write a letter to the Indonesian ambassador in Tokyo asking him to assist 
the Indonesian citizen involved in the case. "Walaupun tjuma sandalan, semua pintu terbuka baginya," 
Ekspres, May 10,1971, p. 12.
33Crouch, Army and Politics, p. 289.
34Si«ar Harapan, July 18, 1970, p. 2.
35"Tugas dan wewenang ASPRI Presiden," Indonesia Raya, August 5, 1970.
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which it had begun the year before.36 In April 1971 Soedjono traveled to Japan to meet 
Prime Minister Sato and to seek a wide assortment of aid. On his return, he was credited 
with having obtained not only 150 tons of rice and $155 million in export credits, but also 
a commitment to provide financing, at a cost of $500 million, for the entire Asahan pro­
ject, including a seaport, the aluminum smelter, and the hydro-electric generation plant. 
He reportedly convinced Sato that Japan should assist Indonesia to develop the project as 
"a monument of friendship of the type of the Aswan Dam built by Russia in Egypt."37
In early 1972, Indonesia put the project up for public bid, with the expectation that 
several companies—in particular, five Japanese and two American—would participate 
in the bidding process. However, by the closing date of July 15, no firms had submitted 
bids,38 because they objected to the requirement that they agree to develop both the 
power plant and the aluminum smelting facility. The US firms considered the former 
uneconomic, and had little hope of securing government subsidized financing for the 
combined project. The Japanese firms were in a particularly difficult position because of 
the impending presidential election within the ruling Liberal Democratic party (LDP) in 
which Sato would be replaced, and the commitment he had made in 1971 to support the 
project would thus be threatened. In light of the enormity of the total investment which 
the project would require, and Indonesia's insistence that the entire project be developed 
as a package deal, it was clear that the foreign firms would be compelled to form a joint 
venture. Reportedly, one of the firms had suggested this to Soedjono, and two of the 
largest Japanese firms, Sumitomo and Mitsubishi, were interested in forming a joint 
venture with the two US aluminum companies interested in the project, Alcoa and 
Kaiser.39
In August, following an informal extension of the bidding period and the change of 
leadership in Japan, it was announced that Soedjono had gone to Japan to discuss the 
project with the Japanese companies which remained interested and with the new 
Japanese government.40 The main obstacle to any agreement at this point was the 
demand of the Japanese companies that their government extend them low interest 
loans to fund the construction of the hydro-electric portion of the project, and the as yet 
unknown readiness of the new LDP government, under Tanaka Kakuei, to do so. 
Soedjono and the special mission which he headed remained in Tokyo for about one 
month before returning to Indonesia in mid-September. Still, no announcement was 
made regarding the progress of his negotiations. Soedjono and his "Special Team" then 
returned to Tokyo for at least three more weeks. Finally, in early October while Soedjono 
was still in Tokyo, it was announced that the Japanese government was prepared to 
grant the Japanese companies loans on easy terms. About a week later, representatives of 
the five Japanese firms arrived in Jakarta and delivered a letter to the Indonesian
36"Proyek Asahan dibagi dalam 5 kontrak detail," Kompas, December 31,1973.
37Wanandi and Djiwandono, "Soedjono Hoemardani," p. 83; and "Walaupun tjuma sandalan, semua pintu 
terbuka baginja," Ekspres, May 10,1971, pp. 14-15.
38"Proyek Asahan: Setelah 67 tahun," Topik (July 1975), p. 34.
39"Proyek Asahan pasti dimulai tahun 1973," Kompas, April 10,1972.
40Soehoed, Asahan, p. 245; and "Indonesia optimis proyek Asahan dimulai awal th. 1973— Aspri Presiden 
Sudjono Humardani berangkat ke Jepang," Kompas, August 29, 1972.
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government, in which they declared their readiness to begin discussions of the project as 
a "package deal" in accordance with the requirements of the Indonesian government.41
Despite the apparent agreement reached between the government of Indonesia and 
the Japanese companies, and between the Japanese companies and their government,42 
negotiations continued through 1973 regarding a wide range of technical and financial 
issues affecting'the future development and operation of the project. However, follow­
ing his success in obtaining the broader commitments needed before this second round 
of talks could proceed, Soedjono's role appears to have diminished. Not until the Basic 
Agreement was signed on January 2, 1974,43 did he appear as publicly involved in the 
project, and then only as an observer; by that point, Soedjono's "Special Team" had 
turned the project over to Mohamad Sadli's "Technical Team."
Soedjono's involvement in the negotiations for the controversial 1972 Japanese "oil 
loan," worth $300 million, are less clear than his role in the Asahan project. However, 
according to one account, he "was the key figure handling negotiations on the Indone­
sian side," and in the end, "[Minister of Foreign Affairs] Fukuda, [Minister of Interna­
tional Trade and Industry] Tanaka and Sudjono became partners . . .  [in] the new com­
pany Japan Indonesia Oil" which was established as an alternative to the existing Far 
East Oil Trading Company (FEOT) both of which were dedicated solely to the export of 
Indonesia's oil to Japan.44 The deal's significance lay in Japan's acquisition of a guaran­
teed long term supply of crude oil, while its controversiality lay in Indonesia's receipt of 
a large amount of loans outside the IGGI-approved—and therefore controlled— 
assistance.
Discussions, which had begun in 1970, reached their peak during the first half of 1972 
and, because of the coming change of leadership in Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic 
party, were affected more than usual by the vagaries of LDP factional politics. Specifically, 
Tanaka Kakuei opposed the deal because he feared that his rival for the LDP presidency, 
Fukuda Takeo, stood to gain financially from it. As the result of a compromise facilitated 
by Kamiya Shotaro, the president of Toyota Motor Sales who had been attempting 
without success for several years to lend $50 million to Indonesia in exchange for oil, 
Tanaka Kakuei and Fukuda Takeo agreed to proceed with a loan package consisting of a 
$200 million soft loan from the OECF and a $100 million private loan from Toyota. In 
exchange, Indonesia agreed to provide 58 million kiloliters (3.65 million barrels) of oil 
over the next ten years, in addition to that for which Japan had already contracted. This
41 "Sudjono Humardhani bicarakan proyek Asahan," Kompas, September 13, 1972; "Pengusaha-pengusaha 
Jepang akan teruskan proyek Asahan," ibid., October 3, 1972; and "Jepang setujui prinsip2 pokok 
pembangunan proyek Asahan," ibid., October 12, 1972.
42The Indonesian government does not appear to have made a serious attempt to cultivate US interest in the 
project. The chief usefulness to Indonesia of having two US companies express some interest was the 
leverage it gave in bargaining with Japan. See, for example, Adam Malik's report following his return from 
New York and Tokyo in which he declared that the US companies would continue to participate in the 
project's development, and the Japanese firms, therefore, no longer had any reason not to continue. "Adam 
Malik: Proyek Asahan bukan persoalan lagi," ibid., October 2, 1972.
43"Perjanjian-dasar proyek Asahan ditandatangani," ibid., January 3,1974.
44Wayne Robinson, 'The Politics of Japanese-Indonesian Energy Cooperation, with Particular Reference to 
the Period 1972-1976" (Ph.D. dissertation, Monash University, 1980), ch. 4. The following discussion of the oil 
loan negotiations are drawn from the descriptions provided in the aforementioned thesis, as well as in Jean 
Bush Aden, "Oil and Politics in Indonesia, 1945-1980" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1988), pp. 358-71. 
See also Petroleum News Southeast Asia (June 1972), p. 6; (September 1972), pp. 4-5; (December 1972), p. 11.
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oil was to be sold to its Japanese customers through a new company, JIO. The agreement 
concluding this deal—hailed as the "most important agreement anywhere between an 
oil consuming and an oil producing nation"45—was signed by President Suharto in 
Tokyo on May 9,1972.
According to Wayne Robinson, two features of the negotiations were "striking." First, 
they were "conducted almost entirely outside formal diplomatic channels," and second, 
"the attitude on both sides was generally cooperative rather than in the nature of formal 
state-to-state dealings.. . .  The talks were . . .  organized informally and on a personal 
basis." Jean Aden emphasizes the dominant role of Suharto himself in these 
negotiations', as opposed to Ibnu Sutowo's previously unfettered activity in oil-related 
fundraising. All these features conform to the style of operating in which Soedjono was 
typically engaged on behalf of the Indonesian government.
Soedjono indirectly confirmed both the informal nature of the talks and the 
centrality of his own role as the president's personal representative, when he com­
mented that,
"The idea [to establish an alternate channel for oil exports to Japan] was revived 
around the end of 1971 when I went to Tokyo and talked with Fukuda—as well as 
Tanaka."46
Although he minimized the impact of Japanese politics on the arrangement of the oil 
loan, Soedjono's comments did reflect the conflict which engaged the Indonesian nego­
tiators—all close advisers of Suharto—in late 1971, as well as the changing nature of the 
negotiations. Initially, in 1970, talks had been carried out between Tanaka Seigen, a 
Japanese oil businessman, and Ibnu Sutowo. However, Tanaka had soon gone over 
Ibnu's head, because of Ibnu's opposition to the creation of another oil export channel in 
addition to FEOT which he had established in 1965. In order to contact President Suharto 
directly, Tanaka went through Alamsjah, still head of the State Secretariat, but this dam­
aged the previously good relations Alamsjah had enjoyed with Ibnu. In the ensuing 
confrontation, Sutowo is said to have "swung strongly in support of the anti-Alamsjah 
group around the President,"47 which, as we have seen, included Soedjono as a leading 
member. In December 1971, Suharto finally removed Alamsjah from his position and in 
early 1972 sent him as ambassador to the Netherlands.
Soedjono was defensive of Ibnu's role, and clearly satisfied that his rival for power in 
Suharto's inner circle and in Indonesia's relations with Japan finally had been removed. 
Less than a year after the signing of the agreement, he claimed:
The problem was that Tanaka Seigen and Alamsjah were involved in dirty dealing. 
What they wanted to do amounted to a revival of the old order practices of corrup­
tion. Tanaka Seigen wanted to buy Ibnu. We won't allow Tanaka Seigen to come to 
Indonesia] anymore. And as for Alamsjah, you can see that he has been made an 
ambassador.48
However, he also minimized the effect of Ibnu's opposition to the loan arrangement, 
saying that
45Petroleum News Southeast Asia (December 1972), p. 11.
46Weinstein, "Notes of interviews," February 26,1973, p. 2.
47Robinson, "Politics of Japanese-lndonesian Energy Cooperation," ch. 4.
48Weinstein, "Notes of interviews," February 26,1973, pp. 1-2.
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"Ibnu is just an instrument, an implementor—he must carry out [the] President's 
decisions. . . .  it doesn't matter what Ibnu's own feelings might have been.. .  .49
*  *  *
Though frequently described as one who preferred the background shadows to the 
glare of the limelight—in contrast to his colleague and fellow Aspri, Ali Murtopo— 
Soedjono was not entirely unwilling to speak about the nature of his work and his ties to 
Japan and its leaders. These topics, among others, were treated in a lengthy news maga­
zine article about Soedjono,50 based primarily on a wide-ranging interview with him. In 
the article, which appeared in the weekly Ekspres, connected to Ali Murtopo's Opsus 
(Operasi Khusus, Special Operations), Soedjono's friendship with Japanese leaders and 
the strength of his ties with them was something of which he was clearly proud. 
According to Ekspres, Soedjono was known among his colleagues as the "'trouble­
shooter' ekonomi RI," and was told by Japan's Prime Minister Sato that he was "the 
bridge between the two countries"; following their meeting in April 1971, Soedjono said, 
Sato asked him to come to Japan more frequently. Soedjono stressed the importance of 
maintaining strong personal relations not only with the Japanese prime minister, but 
with a wide spectrum of Japanese leaders. He emphasized that, because he knew not only 
Prime Minister Sato but also ministers and important figures in the Diet, the 
bureaucracy, and society in general, he was able to accomplish a great deal; a case in 
point, he claimed, was the change in Japanese law which permitted Japan to agree that 
Indonesia's debts could be repaid over a thirty year period without interest.
Two of his former colleagues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) emphasized that Soedjono's role in Indonesia-Japan relations was played out at 
both formal and informal levels. Moreover, they said, he maintained a wide range of 
political contacts, including those with all factions of the ruling Liberal Democratic party, 
as well as the opposition Socialist and Komeito parties. In addition to his acquaintances 
in the Diet, he is said also to have cultivated good ties with the bureaucracy, mass media, 
and, naturally, with Japanese business.51
A multifaceted approach to the conduct of relations with Japan, Soedjono believed, 
was not only useful, but necessary. He saw the Japanese corporations' foreign operations 
and strategy as inextricably enmeshed in the Japanese government's making of foreign 
policy. Such behavior demanded that the Indonesian government adopt a different 
approach to relations with Japan than it practiced towards other countries. Drawing 
upon several years' experience gained from heading such a "different approach," he 
wrote in 1974:
When dealing with Japan, we are faced not just with the government but also with 
the managers of the giant corporations who are very dominant in the formulation of 
every foreign policy move.. . .  The Japanese industries outside Japan will gradually 
control Japan's foreign policy decisions and these decisions will be based purely on 
economic considerations while involving the Japanese government in providing 
political security. It is seen here how difficult it is to solve problems arising between 
Japan and other countries, including Indonesia, if we confine ourselves to 
diplomatical moves.. . .  It is obvious that conventional diplomacy will not be able to
49Ibid., p. 2.
50"Walaupun tjuma sandalan, semua pintu terbuka baginya," Ekspres, May 10,1971, pp. 12-18.
51Wanandi and Djiwandono, "Soedjono Hoemardani," pp. 83-84.
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respond to challenges arising in the relations between Japan and Indonesia.. . .  The 
only way out is a diplomacy which is more comprehensive in substance and chan­
nels because we deal not just with the Japanese government but also with the 
Japanese industries outside Japan.52
Soedjono made no apology for his role in facilitating the flow of private Japanese 
capital into Indonesia. He explained his views this way:
Try to imagine, there is an Indonesian businessman who has no capital at all. But 
there is a Japanese businessman who is willing to give him a loan without interest. 
This means that the Indonesian businessman is able to participate in the venture 
with him. Of course, if the Indonesian businessman cannot afford even 10 percent of 
the capital, how can you complain if the Japanese have a monopoly? That is the 
reason why many Indonesian businessmen today are still minority shareholders. 
Later it will slowly come into line with the government's regulations...  .53
He was clearly aware that others might not approve of his "go-slow" attitude toward the 
development of indigenous enterprise. In 1969, he told an interviewer:
The position of foreigners in our economy is only temporary, because we need their 
help now. We are confident that ultimately it will all be turned over to us. And 
furthermore, even now, it is not accurate to say that foreigners control our economy. 
They are playing a certain role at our invitation—nothing more than that.54
Nor did he express any concern that non-pribumi Indonesians may have benefited from 
the government's economic policies more than pribumi Indonesians:
We offer an opportunity to anyone who wishes to join in development. Those who 
have a plan and a concept/idea. It doesn't matter if they are pribumi or not. All capi­
tal must be exploited regardless of where it comes from...  55
Nevertheless, one of the Indonesian businessmen whom he held in high regard and 
whom he successfully assisted in establishing profitable ties to Japanese business was a 
pribumi, Mohammed Gobel. When asked by Franklin Weinstein in 1973 if there were 
any businessmen with whom it would be helpful to talk, Soedjono told him, "You don't 
want to see people who are not satisfied. All they will do is complain." The first person 
whom he mentioned, and no doubt someone who was well satisfied, was Gobel.56 Gobel 
was the owner of a radio and television assembling company, PT National Gobel, which 
assembled the products of the Japanese electronic company Matsushita with the brand 
name "National." In December 1972, Matsushita agreed to give, through its Indonesian
52Soedjono Hoemardani, "Indonesia-Japan Relations in the Future—A Strategic Review," The Indonesia 
Quarterly 2, 2 (January 1974): 9-10.
53"Tjoba toh, ada orang Indonesia jang sama sekali tidak punja kapital. Tapi ja ada sadja pengusaha 
Djepang jang memindjamkan tanpa rente. Maksudnja supaja pengusaha Indonesia itu bisa ikut dalam 
usaha bersama. Lha kalau 10% sadja dari kapital harus disetor orang Indonesia tidak mampu, bagaimana 
bisa menjalahkan kalau Djepang pegang monopoli. Itu sebabnja banjak pengusaha Indonesia jang andilnja 
kini masih dalam taraf minoritas. Nanti pelan-pelan sesuai dengan peraturan Pemerinta.. . ."  "Soedjono 
Humardhani tentang orang Jepang/' Tempo , January 22,1972, p. 51.
^Weinstein, "Notes of interviews," December 10, 1969, p. 19.
55"Kita memberikan kesempatan bagi semuanya yang mau turut membangun. Mereka jang punja rentjana 
dan konsep. Tidak pandang bulu, apakah ia pribumi atau bukan. Semua modal harus dimanfaatkan 
darimana datangnja-pun.. . . "  Ekspres, May 10,1971, p. 16.
^Weinstein, "Notes of interviews," February 26,1973, p. 7.
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partner, a television studio and broadcasting station worth $500,000 to the city of Ujung 
Pandang to service the region of South Sulawesi. Perhaps it was not a coincidence that 
Gobel's company owned a television assembling plant in that city.57
When questioned directly about his role in the movement of Japanese capital into 
Indonesia, Soedjono first insisted that, "All kinds of businessman come to see me—not 
just the Japanese," but then admitted that, "Naturally, quite a lot of the people who 
come here are Japanese, because our relations are good." Regarding specific functions he 
performed for the foreign businessmen who came to see him, he mentioned the 
following:
Usually they have their own [partners] in mind. But sometimes we tell them if 
someone is good or bad, or introduce them to a good partner.. . .  The condition of 
our bureaucracy is not so good—sometimes [it] takes a long time to get permission 
from various gov[emmen]t agencies. So we try to smooth the way, speed things up.58
Although Soedjono saw no harm in relying on Japanese capital to accomplish those 
goals which Indonesia could not yet achieve on its own, an increasingly large number of 
Indonesians disagreed. Toward the end of 1973, CSIS hosted the first Japan-Indonesia 
Conference, intended, at least in part, to allay the public's fears that Soedjono and his 
allies were selling out the country to the Japanese. As honorary chairman of CSIS and 
head of the Indonesian group attending the conference, Soedjono alluded in his opening 
speech to the atmosphere in which their discussions would take place:
As far as Indonesia is concerned, the "timing" [of the conference] is also proper con­
sidering that the people is actually engaged in open discussions regarding foreign 
investments, including that of Japan, in the context of development strategy of 
Indonesia still seeking for an equilibrium.59
Since part of its goal had been to allay the fears of the public, the actual effect of the con­
ference can only be considered ironic. According to two of Soedjono's CSIS associates, the 
three-day affair was perceived by many as an inflammatory symbol of his links to Japan, 
and only reinforced the view of those who felt that he was too friendly with the Japanese 
and too willing to serve their interests.60
Public opposition to what was perceived as the increasing dominance of foreign cap­
ital in the Indonesian economy was concentrated among the university student popula­
tion and certain elements of the press. These groups tended to focus on the growing role 
of Japanese capital in Indonesia and of Soedjono as its accessory. In late 1973, in Jakarta 
and Bandung, students led the mounting public opposition. Francois Raillon, who stud­
ied the student movement during this period in detail, offers a concise picture of 
Soedjono's place in those events:
57"Jaringan Si Gobel di Sulawesi," Tempo, December 23, 1972.
58Weinstein, "Notes of interviews," February 26,1973, p. 5.
59[sxc] Soedjono Hoemardani, 'T o Promote Good Relations between the Republic of Indonesia and Japan," in 
Japanese-Indonesian Relations in the Seventies, Proceedings of the First Japan-Indonesia Conference, 6 -8  
December 1973 (Jakarta: CSIS, 1974), pp. 9-10.
60Wanandi and Djiwandono, "Soedjono Hoemardani," p. 89.
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Throughout the months of November and December, demonstrations against for­
eign capital and the Aspri multiplied . . .  among [the Aspri] Soedjono Hoemardani in 
particular was regarded as the head, indeed the dukun, of the Japan lobby.61
The unpopularity of his position was reflected in the burning of his effigy and that of 
Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei on several occasions by university students in 
Jakarta and Bandung.62
In addition to finding himself at odds with a large segment of public opinion as a 
result of his extensive and informal contact with Japanese businessmen, Soedjono's 
activities also brought him into conflict with other contenders for power in the presi­
dent's circle of close advisers. Again, the situation which emerged has been most suc­
cinctly described by Raillon:
Indeed, during this period [1972-1973], a struggle for influence, if not for power, took 
shape around President Suharto between two groups, which, to simplify, can be 
called the "American group" and the "Japanese group." The first, composed of tech­
nocratic ministers and certain generals, . . .  was inclined toward a relative revision of 
the mode of development which had been followed until that point . . .  while the 
second was encouraged by the Aspri,. . .  .such as Generals Ali Murtopo and Soedjono 
Hoemardani, and supporters of the continuation of development finance with for­
eign aid, particularly from Japan.63
Following the anti-Japanese riots of January 15, 1974, which coincided with Tanaka's 
visit to Jakarta, Suharto disbanded the Aspri in order to calm public criticism of his 
assistants' undue influence. However, Soedjono was quickly reappointed to two other 
official positions. One was as a member of the Economic Stabilization Council, set up to 
review economic policies of the cabinet and the National Development Planning Board 
(Bappenas); this appointment was interpreted, at least by some, as "re-entry via the back 
door to the political-economic arena."64 Second, pursuant to presidential decisions No. 
25/1974 and No. 102/M/1974, he was installed as one of four Inspectors General of 
Development on July 23, 1974.65 Moreover, at the time, his personal closeness to Presi­
dent Suharto was not expected to diminish, as the relationship between them was so 
personal and long standing.
*  *  *
"Tout au long des mois novembre et decembre, les manifestations, les prises de positions se multiplient 
contre le capital etranger et contre les Aspri . . .  dont notamment Sujono Humardhani, considere comme le 
chef, voire le dukun 'mage' du lobby japonais." Franqois Raillon, Les Etudiants et I'Ordre Nouveau: Politique 
et Ideologie du Mahasiswa Indonesia (1966-1974) (Paris: Association Archipel, 1984), p. 95.
62Ibid., p. 100.
63"En effect, durant cette periode [1972-1973], se dessine autour du President Suharto une lutte d'influence, 
sinon une lutte pour le pouvoir, entre deux clans, que Ton peut appeler pour simplifier le 'parti americain' et 
le 'parti japonais.' Le premier, compose des ministres technocrates et de certains generaux...est favorable a 
une relative revision du mode de developpement mene jusque la, tandis que le second, anime par les Aspris.
. . .  tels que les generaux Ali Murtopo et Sujono Humardhani, et partisan du maintien d'un developpement 
finance avec l'aide d'dtranger et notamment du Japon." Ibid., p. 85.
^Eileen Tang and Yong Mun Cheong, "Indonesia in Focus," in Southeast Asian Affairs 1975 (Singapore: 
ISEAS, 1975), p. 51.
6^M. Sudibjo, ed., Indonesia dan Dunia Internasional 1975 (Jakarta: CSIS, 1976), p.225, citing Berita Yudha, 
July 19,1974.
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An illumination of Soedjono's personal role in Indonesia-Japan relations during the 
period 1966-1974 is useful for understanding the process by which those relations were 
conducted and thereby restored to health, during the formative years of the New Order. 
Although he played a role which was both interesting and significant, one should not 
assume that he was the central figure in all facets of Indonesia-Japan relations through­
out this period. Most notably, he appears not to have exerted any influence in the mas­
sive project in the early and mid-1970s to develop Indonesia's natural gas resources for 
export to Japan. In this instance, Ibnu Sutowo played the key role.
The unsettled nature of the Indonesian government and bureaucracy in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, and the reluctance of the New Order leadership to rely on and 
trust those officials with backgrounds in party politics, meant that important policy 
matters tended to be dealt with informally. In this situation, Soedjono was among those 
who found significant roles to play.His role as personal assistant-cum-representative of 
President Suharto placed him in a position to undertake initiatives at the highest level 
of government. The fact that Suharto saw Alamsjah and then, increasingly, Soedjono as 
his principal intermediaries with Japanese leaders placed the two countries' relations on 
an informal level. Combined with the inexperience of the Suharto government, this led 
to embarassment and frustration on both sides in 1968. However, over the course of the
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next five years, Soedjono was able to establish himself in Japanese eyes as an intermedi­
ary without equal.
The tendency of the New Order to conduct relations on an informal level extended 
only to achieving basic understanding on a given issue, usually regarding the general 
terms of a financial arrangement. Thus, Soedjono played a prominent role in negotia­
tions preceding the signing of the oil loan, but he was not seen to be involved in the 
subsequent discussions regarding the set up of JIO. Likewise, his role in the Asahan 
project was limited to negotiating basic agreements—first, with the Japanese govern­
ment—Sato in 1971 and Tanaka in 1972—to provide financing, and second, with the 
Japanese firms to bid as a consortium for an all-encompassing contract. Both the actual 
signing of agreements and the more technical and narrowly financial issues necessary to 
conclude the agreements and contracts were responsibilities delegated to those in official 
ministerial positions.
In the years following 1974 there were few public manifestations of Soedjono's 
involvement in Indonesia-Japan relations. But his activity clearly did not come to a total 
halt. As someone who relied on a network of personal relationships—beginning with 
his firm and long-standing friendship with the president—to resolve political, eco­
nomic, and bureaucratic problems at an informal level, it is unlikely that his ability to 
operate in these areas was greatly or immediately diminished, or that those who had 
relied on his assistance needed it less.
Soedjono maintained public ties with Japan throughout the 1970s and into the mid- 
1980s by a series of annual Japan-Indonesia conferences sponsored jointly by CSIS and 
the Japan Institute for International Affairs. In his role as honorary chairman of CSIS, he 
had the privilege of giving the opening address and setting the tone/theme for each 
year's meeting. Among the other notable and frequent speakers at these conferences 
were the chairman of Mitsui, the presidents of Nomura Research and the OECF, as well 
as various academicians and government advisers. Although these conferences were 
well publicized affairs, it should be recalled that one of their principal aims was to bring 
influential and concerned individuals together for informal discussions 66 and reflected 
Soedjono's concern that Indonesia's relations with Japan must be handled through non­
governmental channels as well as formal, diplomatic ones.67
The occasion of Soedjono's death in March 1986, in a Tokyo hospital, provided indi­
cations that he had continued to be close to powerful Japanese business and government 
leaders. Before his body was taken back to Indonesia, many of the Japanese he had 
known came to pay their last respects; among those who came were the head of 
Keidanren's Indonesia committee and "high officials from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs." The Japanese ambassador to Indonesia, Muto Toshiaki, not only paid his 
respects in Jakarta, but accompanied the funeral procession from Soedjono's home in 
Jakarta to the family's burial site in Janti, his father's village outside Solo. Those who 
sent condolences to the family included Soedjono's more influential friends and 
acquaintances in Japan: former prime ministers Fukuda Takeo and Kishi Nobasuke, 
former Foreign Minister Abe Shintaro, current Minister of International Trade and 
Industry Watanabe Michi, and the current head of Keidanren, Inayame Yoshiro.68
66Wanandi and Djiwandoro, "Soejono Hoemardani," p.87.
67Hoemardani, "Indonesia-Japan Relations, " pp. 9-10.
68Harry Tjan Silalahi, "Kata Sebuah Riwayat," in Soedjono Hoemardani: Pendiri CSIS, 1918-1986, pp. 1-23.
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Throughout the first two decades of the New Order, and until his death in 1986, 
Soedjono played an important, though not an all-powerful, role in the conduct of 
Indonesia's relations with Japan. The extent of his role depended primarily on his per­
sonal closeness to President Suharto, as did the enduring nature of his role. That the 
scope of his activities narrowed during the latter half of this period (1966-1986), how­
ever, owes mor-e to the maturation of the New Order government than to any change in 
his relationship to the president.
